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Abstract.  This article describes the security relevance of an article published 45 years ago by the 
recently deceased social psychologist, Marie Jahoda. 
 
Marie Jahoda, the great social psychologist, recently passed away at the age of 94.  Her research 
centered on the elucidation of social Issues and featured a rare combination of both political import and 
scientific rigor.  One article that was published in 1956 within the pages of the American Psychologist 
still provides unusually rich heuristic value in the context of personnel security and counterintelligence 
programs within political organizations. 
 
Jahoda's article, "Psychological Issues in civil liberties," was written in an era of political witch hunts, 
coercive loyalty oaths, and seeming paranoia about the scope of a communist threat to the United 
States (US).  This era was all the more problematic in that there was a very significant espionage threat 
to the US from the Soviet Union, yet some of the very counterespionage interventions employed by the 
US seemed to nurture the Soviet threat.  "Psychological Issues" described threats to US civil liberties 
from these interventions, analyzed conformism as these interventions' main consequence, and further 
identified four processes of conformism--viz., consentience, conformance, convergence, and 
compliance--that could be either compatible or incompatible with sound security behavior. 
 
The focus on conformism is of special note.  Conformism can serve as a cover for the violation of 
security and weaken the very security for which a government seeks it.  In the former case, the kind of 
security most successfully obtained through coercive loyalty oaths and a seemingly paranoid attitude 
towards a communist espionage threat is a restricted tolerance for deviation from mean, median, and 
modal behavior.  Once one exhibits behavior within the range of tolerance, one ceases to be perceived 
as a significant threat, regardless of how much a threat one may pose.  In this regard, it is ironic that 
many personnel security documents counsel personnel security adjudicators to approve people whose 
behavior suggests honesty, good character, integrity, and the like.  Appearing to possess these traits, 
characteristics, or tendencies certainly facilitates the commission of espionage, and the appearance is 
strongly facilitated by behaving within a restricted range of tolerance. 
 
In the latter case, remaining within a restricted range of tolerance also may impede stellar 
accomplishment via unusually intense labor, a singular focus on an area of endeavor wherever that area 
may lead, and great determination to succeed.  One becomes security worthy through the avoidance of 
excellence and through the approach of the mundane.  The political organization suffers as a result. 
 
The notions that the same psychological construct could suggest security strengths and weaknesses and 
that a political organization could unknowingly weaken its security in its very zeal for security remain 
launching points for personnel security and counterintelligence researchers and practitioners today.  
Ironically, Marie Jahoda--in her quest to fight threats to civil liberties--simultaneously provided insight 
that could increase and decrease these threats to the political organization that was itself threatened.  
(See Handlon, B.J., & Squier, L.H.  (1955). Attitudes toward specialty loyalty oaths at the University of 
California.  American Psychologist, 10, 121-127; Jahoda, M.  (1956). Psychological Issues in civil liberties.  
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American Psychologist, 11, 234-240; Lipset, S.M.  (1953). Opinion formation in a crisis situation.  Public 
Opinion Quarterly, 17, 20-46; Sanford, N.  (1953). Individual and social change in a community under 
pressure: The oath controversy.  Journal of Social Issues, 9, 25-42; Sargent, S.S., & Harris, B.  (1986). 
Academic freedom, civil liberties, and SPSSI.  Journal of Social Issues, 42, 43-67; Saxon, W.  (May 10, 
2001).  Marie Jahoda, psychologist who studied work and women, dies at 94.  The New York Times, 
http://www.nytimes.com.) (Keywords: Counterintelligence, Espionage, Jahoda, Personnel Security.) 
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